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STABILITY VERSUS EMPLOYEE
FREE CHOICE
George W. Brookst
The collective bargaining system in private industry' in the
United States, currently marked by a great deal of "responsibility"
and "maturity" on both sides of the table, enjoys a deserved
prestige. In many respects we have the best of all possible worlds;
we have very little governmental intervention in labor-management
relations and at the same time a surprisingly low incidence of
strikes.
These developments have been illustrated dramatically in the
Experimental Negotiating Agreement (ENA) entered into in
March 1973 between the United Steelworkers of America and the
Coordinating Committee Steel Companies. 2 Ten major steel
companies are signatory to the agreement which committed the
parties not to strike under any circumstances. The accomplishment
is even more impressive because the final agreement was concluded
without use of the arbitration machinery set up as an alternative.
This agreement has encouraged people to believe that the same
kind of arrangement might be extended to other industries.
It should be noted that the Steelworkers have a relatively
centralized bargaining structure and process-highly centralized
for the basic steel industry where ENA was negotiated. Under the
terms of the union constitution, all collective bargaining
agreements are between the international union and employer.
ENA was signed by the national president and other members of
the executive board. Some 600 local union delegates from the basic
steel industry approved the agreement by a voice vote. The
Steelworkers' constitution does not require membership ratification
of agreements.
This steel agreement is the latest step in a well-defined trend.
Dating roughly from the two or three years following World War
II there has been a diminution of strikes; an enlargement of
t Professor of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University; B.A. 1930, Yale
University; M.A. in Economics 1932, Brown University.
' This paper deals exclusively with the law of labor relations in private industry.
Transferring the basic concepts of this law and the practice of bargaining to the public sector
raises a host of complications not considered here, although much of what is said would
apply in specialized ways to public sector experience.
I For a description of the agreement, see UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, REPORT
OF OFFICERS TO THE SEVENTEENTH CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 18-25 (1974).
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bargaining units, which tends to increase the stability and
predictability of the bargaining process; changes in bargaining
structure, which tend in the same direction; and a lengthening of
the term of most agreements.
I
THE CHANGE FROM 1935 TO 1976
This pattern of collective bargaining evolution is well known.
Not so well known is that the changes have been accompanied by a
systematic and substantial withdrawal of the right of free choice
from employees. 3 And in the long run this change may be the most
important one that has occurred.
The role of free choice was central in the minds of the authors
of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).4 It was decided in
1935, contrary to the inclinations of President Roosevelt, that
self-help, not regulation, would be relied upon to improve the lot
of working people. 5 Self-help was to be achieved through labor
organizations:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection. 6
Free choice was strengthened further in the Taft-Hartley Act
amendments in 1947 by the addition of the words:
[A]nd shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by
an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment as authorized in Section 8(a)(3).7
Section 8(a)(3) restricted enforcement of union shop provisions to
the payment of "periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly
required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership."
3 A more accurate statement might be that withdrawal of free choice is the essence of
the change.
4 National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-68 (1970).
5 79 CONG. REc. 7565-74, 7648-61, 7668-81, 9676-711, 9713-31 (1935).
6 National Labor Relations Act § 7, ch. 372, § 7, 49 Stat. 452, as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§ 157 (1970).
7 Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, ch. 120, § 7, 61 Stat. 136, as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
8 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970).
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The Landrum-Griffin Act of 19599 is an expression and
extension of the same policy:
The Congress further finds, from recent investigations in the
labor and management fields, that there have been a number of
instances of breach of trust, corruption, disregard of the rights
of individual employees, and other failures to observe high
standards of responsibility and ethical conduct which require
further and supplementary legislation that will afford necessary
protection of the rights and interests of employees and the public
generally.10
The text of the law does not regulate or limit the scope of union
activity. Congress again asserted its belief that unions can and
ought to be democratic, responsible, and representative, and
enacted its remedies accordingly.
Thus, the legislation is clear. Wages and other conditions of
employment were, for the most part, not established through
congressional enactment, but were to be accomplished through
negotiations between voluntary organizations of workers and their
employers. Implicit is that the right to self-organization should be
protected, and that employees should have the right to choose the
organization they think serves them best or to reject organization
altogether. Unions, when chosen by workers through a democratic
election, should be democratic and responsive to their member-
ship.
Even if it were not specifically stated in the NLRA, it would
have to be clear that democratic and responsive organizations can
be achieved only where workers have a wide range of free choices.
But the parties to the collective bargaining arrangement normally
find that a limitation on the free choice of employees is very much
in their institutional interests. The term "party" ' (or "parties")
refers to the formal institutional structures of the unions and
employers which are committed to the carrying out of the collective
bargaining arrangements. These are bureaucracies or oligarchies
whose interests should under no circumstances be equated with the
interests of the members of the union. This is an obvious and
nonpejorative statement; it is not meant to imply, for example, that
unions as institutions do not serve the interests of their members,
nor that the goals of both may not be in many cases identical. But
the primary goals of the union-wages and other conditions of
9 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73
Stat. 519 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
10 29 U.S.C. § 401(b) (1970).
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employment-will never be the only goals of the union as an
institution, however well such goals may be served by that
institution."
There are few, if any, full-time union personnel who wish to
maximize the opportunities for employees to change unions, reject
unions, or withdraw individually or collectively from the union of
which they are members.' 2 Although the American trade union
movement had its largest and most dramatic advances during the
period of intense rivalry between the AFL and CIO,' 3 the
leadership was virtually unanimous in wanting to put an end to
what they called "raiding."
This position was never stated more baldly than by the Report
and Recommendations of the Joint AFL-CIO Committee on Labor
Unity.1 4 The Report reviewed the statistics of rival unionism and
found that during the years 1951 and 1952 there were 1,245 cases
of raiding-the CIO the petitioner in 700, the AFL in about 500.
In all, 366,470 workers were involved, of whom only 62,000
changed their affiliation from one federation to another. Of these,
35,000 were taken by an AFL union from a CIO union, and the
CIO took 27,000 from the AFL. The net change in membership
totals was only 8,000 workers, or less than two percent of the total
number of workers involved.
This condition was apparently regarded by the members of the
joint committee as conclusive proof that raiding was a waste of time
and money. Nothing could dramatize more clearly the contrast
11 For a discussion of this subject, see A. Ross, TRADE UNION WAGE POLICY 22-24
(1948).
12 Perhaps the best evidence is the attitude of union officers and staff toward the
Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin attempts to protect individual free choice. The union
position was uniformly that these statutes were repugnant. The Taft-Hartley Act was
described as a "slave labor law." Both laws were labeled "anti-union" and "anti-labor," and
the limitations on compulsory unionism received special mention. Concerning the
Taft-Hartley amendments, see AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR, REPORT OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTY-SIXTH CONVENTION 260-62 (1947); AMERICAN FEDERATION OF
LABOR, REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL TO THE SIXTY-SIXTH CONVENTION 405-07 (1947).
See also, CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, FINAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINTH
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 86-89, §3-94 (1947). On Landrum-Griffin, see I AFL-CIO
PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 613-16 (1959); 2 PROCEEDINGS OF
THE THIRD CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra, at 371.
13 For a detailed account of rival unionism in various industries before 1941, see W.
GALENSON, THE CIO CHALLENGE TO THE AFL (1960), and for characterization of effects, see
id. at 615.
14 See AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
SEVENTY-SECOND CONVENTION 82-85 (1953). The Joint Committee included top officers of
the two federations. The study of raiding effects was made by a subcommittee including
George Meany, Walter Reuther, William Schnitzler, James Carey, Matthew Woll, and David
McDonald.
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between the interests of the unions as institutions and the interests
of the members thereof. Is it not possible that every one of
the 366,470 workers was better off as a result of the raids or
attempted raids? The majority of workers that changed affiliations
certainly thought they were better off. It is more than a possibility
that the unions which retained their membership in the face of a
raid did so after promising, and possibly achieving, a better record
of representation in the eyes of their own membership. It is even
more likely that millions of workers whose representation was not
challenged were more conscientiously represented than they would
have been if the possibility of the raid had not been present.
By the early 1950's, the union leadership had become
thoroughly tired of rival unionism. A number of bilateral pacts
were written to limit rivalry, and both the AFL and the CIO
established within their own ranks some limitations upon raiding.
It was unmistakably the major goal of the merger to put an end
to raiding altogether. The effort was successful even beyond
the fondest expectations of its principal advocates. "Established
collective bargaining relationships" are now protected by the
AFL-CIO constitution 5 against raiding by any other affiliate, and
the Internal Disputes Plan provides the enforcement machinery. In
the last ten years, the annual case load of complaints has been well
under 150. The procedure includes mediation, impartial umpires,
and appeal to the Executive Council.' 6 A union found in violation
is placed under sanctions, deprived of any protection against
raiding, and ultimately subjected to expulsion.
The disenchantment with raiding extends beyond the
AFL-CIO. The United Automobile Workers did not engage in
raiding after they left the AFL-CIO, and were not in turn raided
by the affiliates.' 7 After the Teamsters were expelled from the
AFL-CIO, there was a small amount of raiding in both directions,
but this has fallen off to virtually nothing.'8 Another example of
15 The integrity of each such affiliate of this Federation shall be maintained and
preserved. Each such affiliate shall respect the established collective bargaining
relationship of every other affiliate and no affiliate shall raid the established
collective bargaining relationship of any other affiliate.
AFL-CIO CONST. art. III, § 4 (1973). See 1 DECISIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
AFL-CIO IMPARTIAL UMPIRE 1954-1958, at 3 (1958).
16 AFL-CIO, REPORT OF THE AFL-CIO EXECUTIVE COUNCIL TO THE TENTH CONSTrru-
TIONAL CONVENTION 54-55 (1973).
17 An exception was a three-way contest at McDonnell Douglas in St. Louis in 1968 in
which the Machinists, the Teamsters, and the Automobile Workers were involved. Briel,
Rebel Union Battles 2 Giants to Represent 21,500 Workers at McDonnell St. Louis Plant, Wall St. J.,
Sept. 12, 1968, at 32, col. 1.
18 On Nov. 5, 1975 the Teamsters union cancelled its no-raid pacts with all AFL-CIO
[Vol. 61:344
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significant organized rival union activity was that conducted by
District 50 of the United Mine Workers; this organization, after a
short period of independent status, has now been obliterated,
having been absorbed by the United Steelworkers of America.
Thus, one of the principal opportunities for freedom of choice
among workers has been eliminated by the action of the unions in
committing themselves not to interfere with the established
representation of any other affiliate for any reason whatever.
No one can quarrel with the right of unions to refuse to raid
each other. Many trade union leaders hold that it is an affront to
the whole movement for one union to attempt to take over the
members of another union; the AFL principle, "one organization
in the trade," was a firm assertion of this conviction.' 9 But the fact
of "no raiding" should be noted as a major change in our labor
relations climate.
In 1976 the employer in large parts of industry, especially
mass production industry, has the same interest as the union in
promoting stability, and thus desires no changes of representation
and nothing to disturb the predictability that comes with a long and
close association between employer and union representatives. By
this time the background circumstances of labor relations in this
country stand in sharp contrast to 1935. Although most employers
would probably prefer no union at all, and in some industries
employers continue to fight organization of their employees vigor-
ously and successfully, there are large areas of industry, especially
in mass production, where employers have made peace with the
union.2 0 The typical employer in steel, autos, rubber, paper, and
many other industries is no longer trying to get rid of the union.
He has accommodated to it in the interest of stable industrial
relations at the work place.
The industrial relations director is the pivot of the new rela-
tionship. His task is to get along with the union representative,
usually at intermediate and top levels of the organization, i.e., to
make settlements and administer them systematically, peacefully,
and without work stoppage.
unions because of a dispute over organizing California farm workers. See Wall St. J., Nov. 6,
1975, at 8, col. 2.
19 The union concept of jurisdiction refers to the exclusive right of an organization to
organize and bring into its membership all the workers of a dearly defined trade or industry
group, so that only one organization represents the employees involved. See P. TAFT, THE
A.F. OF L. IN THE TIME OF GOMPERS 185-87, 210 (1957).
20 For a discussion of this development, see R. LESTER, As UNIONs MATURE (1958), and
especially id at 373-455.
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The most important evidence of this change is the employer's
willingness to write into the collective bargaining agreement a
provision for compulsory union membership. 21 He thus requires
that every employee in the bargaining unit shall become and
remain a member of the union with which he has signed a contract.
He regards this as essential to stable industrial relations in his
plant. On this matter he and the union representative share a
common perspective.
II
THE EROSION OF EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE
Thus the union and the unionized employer were committed
to the same stability and predictability, and they joined forces to
that end. There remained only the problem of the law, which
dearly protected the rights of employees. The process by which the
free choice provisions of the statute have been subverted is a
mixture of law and its administration, employer institutional in-
terests, union institutional interests, and their imposition upon the
administrative machinery of the government at various levels.
A. Compulsory Unionism and Exclusive Representation
Section 7 of the NLRA, as amended, is the starting point.2 2 It
legalizes compulsory unionism, with the employer enforcing the
compulsion through the bargaining agreement. It should be noted
that compulsory unionism has an honorable history. In the days of
aggressive, successful anti-unionism by employers, it was the price
of survival to have some form of compulsory union membership.
Without it, the anti-union employer "picked off" the union mem-
bers, hired new employees who were committed against unionism,
and thus gradually or quickly eroded the union's membership.
Under these circumstances, the union shop was a legitimate and
essential weapon against an anti-union employer; it also served to
hide the union's strengths and weaknesses. But no such argument
can be made for the union shop today, certainly not in the many
industries in which the union has been adopted as a permanent
feature of the employer-employee relationship. It is not conceiv-
able, for example, that the Automobile Workers need a union shop
to protect .themselves against the four major automobile com-
panies.
21 There are exceptions, of course, of which the most important is the General Electric
Company.
12 See text at note 6 supra.
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What began as a weapon of the union against an anti-union
employer has become a weapon wielded by the employer on the
union's behalf against employees who, for one reason or another,
wish to sever their relation with the union and stop paying dues. To
many employees, and for some problems, there seems to be no other
remedy. If the possibility of changing representatives or decertify-
ing is nil or nearly so, ceasing to pay dues is virtually the only
recourse available to dissatisfied employees.
Union dogma has it, of course, that there will be a very large
number of "free riders" in the absence of the union shop. Of
course there will be. All voluntary organizations have the problem
of free riders, and coping with that problem is at the very heart of
the democratic process. The rest of union dogma is that the union
will therefore become "weak," as if this matter were relevant. Why
should a union be any stronger than is desired by the people it
represents? The only persuasive case for withdrawing freedom of
choice about union membership is that the employer is
demonstrably trying to destroy the union. This is the historical
justification for the union shop. There are still such employers, but
very few of them in unionized mass production industries. 23
The union shop, operating in conjunction with various aspects
of labor law, withdraws free choice in ways that are less than
apparent to persons unfamiliar with the internal life of unions.
Ironically, administration of the Landrum-Griffin Act has had an
effect contrary to what might have been expected of a statute
designed to protect individual member's rights. When the courts
ruled that the law was satisfied if local dues were increased by
majority vote at the national convention, many unions proceeded
to use the convention to raise minimum dues, thus depriving local
unions of their traditional right and practice of fixing dues by vote
of the local membership.24 The union delegate often is a local
officer who would prefer to say to his members, "I'm sorry but the
convention voted the increase, and we have no choice," than to try
to get dues increased by action of the local union.
The union shop and compulsory unionism are buttressed by
the principle of exclusive representation, written into the original
NLRA in 1935. The issue had been controversial in prior years,
with some support on the side of non-exclusive representation.25
23 The issue of union security poses a problem which may be soluble only through some
device that permits unions to negotiate a union shop clause only during the initial seven- or
eight-year period of an established collective bargaining relationship.
24 Ranes v. Office Employees Local 28, 317 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1963).
2- See the discussion of this issue in relation to the National Labor Board, in L. LORWIN
1976]
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Adoption of the principle of exclusive representation has
eliminated from discussion and consideration the alternative and
its advantages. Instead, everyone in a "unit" determined by the
Board to be appropriate is represented by the union which wins a
majority-those who vote for the union, those who vote against the
union, and those who do not vote at all. This idea now has almost
total acceptance, and is being adopted in state labor legislation,
including public employment,26 with few exceptions. Exclusive
representation imposes a significant limitation on free choice.
B. Multiplant Bargaining Units
After compulsory unionism and exclusive representation, the
NLRB's rulings on multiplant units have probably done more to
destroy employee free choice than any other aspect of labor
relations law. The union leadership and the employer have a
common interest in promoting multiplant agreements which the
NLRB then finds a bar to an election in any one plant of the group.
The employer prefers the stability, the absence of change, and the
predictability that a successful multiplant agreement provides. The
union's institutional interest is obvious.
The text of the law says little on this subject, providing simply:
The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to
employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed...
the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining
shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision
thereof. 7
In the earliest days of the NLRA, the rivalry between the AFL and
CIO unions served to preserve some of this freedom as the two
federations vied for the same workers and espoused single plant or
multiplant units as their interests of the moment seemed to
require.28 However, with time and the development of operating
relationships between employer and union, both parties acquired a
& A. WUBNIG, LABOR RELATIONS BOARDS-THE REGULATION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
UNDER THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY ACT 191-95 (1935), and see especially the
dissenting view of Mr. de Pont, id. at 193.
26 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.61-.76 (Supp. 1975), and specifically § 179.63(6);
N.Y. CiV. SERV. §§ 200-14 (McKinney 1973), 18 NYCRR 201.9 (1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
§§ 1101.101-.230 (Supp. 1975) ("Representatives selected by public employees in a unit
appropriate for collective bargaining purposes shall be the exclusive representative of all the
employees in such unit to bargain on wages, hours, terms and conditions of employment," id.
§ 1101.606).
27 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1970) (emphasis added).
28 See Brooks & Thompson, Multiplant Units: The NLRB's Withdrawal of Free Choice, 20
IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 363, 364-68 (1967).
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preference for the larger unit, which they were able to persuade
the NLRB was in the interests of stable industrial relations. Long
before the merger of the AFL and CIO and the no-raid pact, the
institutional advantages of the multiplant agreement, solidified and
protected by the NLRB, became clear to both employer and union.
After a number of years in which the position of the NLRB
with respect to multiplant units fluctuated widely, it adopted the
policy of finding a single plant unit appropriate in new orga-
nizing-a policy that has for many years been a bastion of free
choice for employees.2 9 But a change during World War II
affecting existing multiplant units led to a permanent locking in of
thousands of employees in multiplant and multiemployer
agreements. When the International Woodworkers of America
(IWA) filed a petition for the Hoquiam, Washington plant of
Rayonier, Inc., the NLRB refused to hold an election in the one
plant because of the history of bargaining on a multiplant,
multiemployer basis.
The record indicates that during the period covered by uniform
labor agreements and joint collective bargaining on the part of
both unions and employers, the pulp and paper industry in the
Pacific Coast area has been singularly free from major industrial
strife.30
The petition was dismissed despite the fact tlat the IWA had
almost unanimous support from the Hoquiam employees.
Subsequent events suggest that the members of the NLRB
were premature, to put it mildly, in their assessment of industrial
relations in the West Coast paper industry. About twenty-five years
later, the famed Uniform Labor Agreement blew up, following a
long period of smoldering local grievances and resentments against
the international unions which dominated the collective bargain-
ing relationships. In 1964, some 20,000 West Coast members
succeeded in the difficult task of forming an independent union
which wrested representation rights away from the two interna-
tional unions that had secured a region-wide bargaining agreement
in 1934.31 The independent union continued for a few years to
bargain for changes in the coast-wide agreement, but the old
dissatisfactions persisted and led the union to propose that bargain-
29 See Cluett, Peabody & Co., 31 N.L.R.B. 505 (1941); Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 31
N.L.R.B. 243 (1941); Allied Laboratories, Inc., Pitman-Moore Division, 23 N.L.R.B. 184
(1940); Hood Rubber Co., 20 N.L.R.B. 485 (1940); United States Rubber Co., 20 N.L.R.B.
473 (1940); Chrysler Corp., 13 N.L.R.B. 1303 (1939).
30 Rayonier, Inc., Grays Harbor Division, 52 N.L.R.B. 1269, 1273-74 (1943).
31 See H. GRAHAM, THE PAPER REBELLION (1970).
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ing be at two levels, with certain issues bargained region-
wide, others locally. 32 The employers, through their Association of
Pulp and Paper Manufacturers, informed the union that each
employer would withdraw from the Uniform Labor Agreement if
two-level bargaining were demanded. The withdrawal was com-
pleted, and bargaining went back to local plants that year.33 In the
next few years, a combination of company-wide and local bargain-
ing arrangements were developed company by company. Although
the employers and union attempted to reinstate multi-employer
bargaining, at the initiative of the companies, the local unions
rejected the plan.34
The West Coast paper industry experience is the only case in
which a multiplant unit of such size and magnitude has been taken
apart by action of the employees; the difficult task of forming a
competing independent union was necessary for this purpose.
Although it was the employers who decided to dismantle the
agreement, their action was based upon the decision of the local
unions to demand a division of bargaining subjects between central
and plant level with a possibility of a local strike if no agreement
were reached. There have been problems of plant closings, as well
as strikes, but the local unions apparently are unwilling to return to
the region-wide agreement. 35
The 1941 Rayonier case demonstrates how the law has been
interpreted--one might better say misinterpreted-to cause em-
ployees to lose their freedom of choice and their "representation,"
in favor of representation for unions. The parties to the proceed-
ings before the NLRB were the company, the incumbent union of
which the Hoquiam local union was a part, and the raiding union,
IWA. The company preferred to retain the existing union, with
which it had a "good relationship" in a multiplant unit. The
incumbent union naturally wanted to retain its right to represent
employees at the plant. The local union, ostensibly representing
32 The Rebel, Nov. 13, 1968, at 2; id. Oct. 30, 1968, at 3; id. Oct. 16, 1968, at 3. These
articles are a series by Hugh Bannister, then president of the Association of Western Pulp &
Paper Workers.
33 See The Rebel, Jan. 29, 1969, at 1; id. Jan. 15, 1969, at 1, and subsequent issues. In
Mar. 1971 a union bargaining board representing ten local unions opened company-wide
negotiations with Crown Zellerbach, and during the same period negotiations were begun
with Weyerhaeuser for four mills at different locations. In May both sets of mills were on
strike. See The Rebel, Mar. 24, 1971, at 1.
34 The Rebel, Aug. 9, 1972, at 4-5; id., Sept. 6, 1972, at 1.
" This case has a number of unique aspects. One is that no other parent union in any
of the mass production industries would likely permit the local unions to make the decision
about the unit.
[Vol. 61:344
EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE
the majority of its members, was attached to the international by
constitutional provision. The local officers would have to support
the international's position or run the risk of being disciplined. The
raiding union desired to represent the employees, but was pre-
vented by NLRB policy. Today, with the no-raid pact, there would
be no one to make the challenge.
Since the Rayonier case, there have been a number of others in
which the same issue has arisen. The Board considers the history
of bargaining as a controlling factor in all the cases.36 Where
employer and union have bargained for two or more plants as a
single unit, employees in a single plant are not given a choice of
having separate representation, or of having no representation at
all. Although in some more recent cases, the union has been
permitted to withdraw from a multiemployer agreement, just as an
employer may, "union" here means the certified representative and
not the spokesman for the dissatisfied employees. 37
Free choice of representatives is totally obliterated in major
segments of some industries by the presence of multiplant
bargaining contracts. Supported by NLRB policy, hundreds of
thousands of workers in such industries as autos, steel, rubber,
men's clothing, ladies' clothing, hotels and restaurants, and others,
are effectively and permanently denied any choice of bargaining
representative. A worker who hires into the automobile industry
will pay dues to the UAW for as long as he remains in the
bargaining unit; there is not the slightest possibility that he or his
fellow workers can ever make a change. 38
A few capital-intensive industries have held out against
multiplant bargaining, most notably nonferrous metals, chemicals,
oil, and food. This position has always been taken over the
objections of the unions, which systematically seek to enlarge the
bargaining unit-in part precisely because it does withdraw free
choice, and thus makes easier the running of the union. 39
'8 Brooks & Thompson, supra note 28, at 370-73.
37 Cf Retail Associates Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 388, 393 (1958). Although this decision does
not deal exclusively with the issue of a union right to withdraw from a multiplant
agreement, it clearly implies that the employer and union have an equal right to withdraw
under prescribed conditions.
38 References of this type to the United Automobile Workers should not be interpreted
as indicating that the UAW is the worst of unions. On. the contrary, it is the best or one of
the best in the way it has preserved democratic processes.
39 It is perhaps gratuitous to note that no objection is being raised here to multiplant
bargaining. Workers in two or more plants ought to be able to join together in a single
bargain if the employer is willing or can be persuaded to consent. But they ought equally to
have the right to withdraw from such an arrangement.
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C. Ban on Skilled Craft Units
A special and crucial application of the NLRB's multiplant
policy is reflected in a series of decisions involving skilled workers
in the auto industry. The Board's decision not to permit any
elections for auto industry skilled tradesmen was based on the
multiplant rule,40 but it is also part of the policy which has evolved
to eliminate separate units for skilled craftsmen in manufacturing
industries. This position has been taken by the Board in the face of
an apparently specific congressional instruction to the contrary.41
From Globe Machine and Stamping Co., 42 to National Tube
Company,43 to American Potash and Chemical Corporation,44 and finally
to Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, 45 the Board has virtually made it
impossible for skilled workers to establish a unit of their own in the
face of competition from an industrial union that petitions for the
whole plant. The NLRB has also eliminated the prospect of
severance from an established plant-wide unit. For skilled workers,
this decision has meant a significant withdrawal of free choice.
In applying Mallinckrodt to subsequent cases, the NLRB
engages in circular reasoning to deny skilled craftsmen any right to
a change of representation. The following is from the Board's 1974
Annual Report, referring to a craft severance case at Union
Carbide Corporation:
The Board majority specifically observed that the machinists had
their own elected stewards; they had in the past participated, and
continued to participate, in various of the committees of the
intervenor, which represented the production and maintenance
employees including them; they had made frequent use of the
40 See notes 27-39 and accompanying text supra.
41 Provided, That the Board shall not...
(2) decide that any craft unit is inappropriate for such purposes on the ground
that a different unit has been established by a prior Board determination, unless a
majority of the employees in the proposed craft unit vote against separate represen-
tation ....
29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(2) (1970).
42 3 N.L.R.B. 294 (1937) (elections ordered held to determine whether or not majority
of workers in craft groups preferred to be represented by industrial unions or to be rep-
resented separately by craft unions).
43 76 N.L.R.B. 1199 (1948) (craft group's petition to sever from industrial union de-
nied).
44 107 N.L.R.B. 1418 (1954) (craft group appropriate for severance when it qualifies as
genuine craft group and when union seeking to represent it traditionally represents that
craft).
45 162 N.L.R.B. 387 (1966) (instrument mechanics' petition for severance from
plant-wide unit denied where unit seen as homogeneous, established, and stable bargaining
unit).
[Vol. 61:344
EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE
grievance procedures and had seen their grievances processed;
they had the opportunity to voice their concerns to the officers of
intervenor's local and international; and finally the intervenor
had repeatedly represented their interest at the bargaining table.
Thus, in the opinion of the majority, both in form and substance,
the intervenor had not been shown to have inadequately
represented the machinists and instrument makers. Relying on
the foregoing factors, the majority, under the Mallinckrodt tests,
refused to allow the petitioner to carve out the machinists and
instrument makers from the established and stable bargaining
relationship in the overall unit.46
"Foregoing factors" refers to the Board's emphasis on petitioning
workers use of common working conditions and facilities with
other production workers.
To both Board arguments, one can only ask how the
conditions could possibly have been different under a production
and maintenance unit agreement. So long as the workers were
covered by the agreement (including a union shop), one would
expect them to take part in the union's affairs. When the workers
reached the point of being able to petition for separate
representation, it was hardly reasonable to use their record of
participation against them.
Dissatisfaction among skilled tradesmen who do maintenance
work in manufacturing plants under industrial union agreements is
widespread and well known. Even were it not for the comparisons
made with wages and other conditions in the construction trades,
there would be a problem because the maintenance man has almost
universally suffered a narrowing of the wage differential between
skilled and unskilled rates under industrial union agreements.
The NLRB decision on skilled workers in the automobile
industry was made before Mallinckrodt and was based on the
multiplant issue rather than on the real issue-craft severance.
46 39 NLRB ANN. REP. 62 (1974). The dissenting voice is also quoted, as a footnote,
thus:
Dissenting, Chairman Miller and Member Fanning viewed the application of
Mallinckrodt to the facts in Union Carbide as supporting craft severance. In their
view, the machinists, skilled journeymen craftsmen, had exercised an unusually
sustained effort to maintain their identity as a separate craft group. Citing the
group's many efforts to secure other representation, Chairman Miller and Member
Fanning observed that the machinists had never had an opportunity to vote on the
question of separate representation. While conceding that 26 years of bargaining
history is a factor to be considered, Chairman Miller and Member Fanning believed
that it should not outweigh the persistent effort of this craft group to maintain its
separate identity and at long last to achieve an opportunity to vote on separate
representation.
Id. at 62 n.52.
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Subsequent events within the union add further evidence of the
underlying problem and the significance of the Board's position.
The auto industry cases cannot be understood independently
of what was happening within the United Automobile Workers
(UAW) during and after the pendency of the cases. Dissatisfaction
among skilled tradesmen in the automobile industry had moved
the international union by 1957 to propose constitutional changes
which would increase the representation given to skilled craftsmen
in bargaining arrangements and also give them procedures for
negotiating matters of special interest to them. At this time cases
were pending before the NLRB, filed by a group of independ-
ent unions of skilled craftsmen, the leader of which was the
International Society of Skilled Trades (ISST), organized in the
auto industry especially in and around Detroit. The threat of
NLRB elections and the possibility of losing significant numbers of
skilled workers persuaded the leadership of the union to offer the
skilled workers some autonomy. The union convention in the
spring of 1957 debated a proposal to provide relief, and the nature
of the debate makes clear that the task was most difficult.47
The committees which reviewed the proposed changes in the
constitution presented a majority report, recommending language
that would permit the International Executive Board to give the
skilled workers the right to vote separately on contractual matters
related exclusively to them. There was a minority report repre-
senting the views of the production workers. With the support of
the national officers, the majority report was adopted by the
convention.
The next year, the NLRB made its decision in a key group of
cases, dismissing the petitions because they were not "coextensive
with the existing bargaining unit. '48 The independent skilled
trades unions had filed petitions at seventy or eighty locations in
different parts of the country, and they were all dismissed in
consonance with this decision. The Board was suggesting, in effect,
that the craftsmen had to petition for separation from a unit
composed of more than 120 plants across the country, where more
47 See UNITED AUTOMOBILE WORKERS OF AMERICA (UAW), PROCEEDINGS, SIXTEENTH
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 272-88 (1957).
48 General Motors, Cadillac Motor Car Division, Pontiac Motor Division, Fisher Body
Division, and The Ford Motor Company, 120 N.L.R.B. 1215, 1221 (1958). These cases
involved seven different petitions filed with the Board and consolidated during the hearings
for purposes of both hearing and decision. In addition to the petitions on which these
hearings were held, others had been filed in various Regional Offices presenting essentially
the same issues.
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than 300,000 workers were employed under a union shop
agreement. The logistics of such an organizing task, even confined
to skilled workers, would be difficult for the largest unions, and
certainly impossible for the ISST.
The NLRB's decision might have been expected to dispose of
the problem, but the dissatisfactions of the skilled tradesmen
persisted, as did their organizing efforts. Again in 1966 at the
UAW convention efforts were underway to deal with this stubborn
problem. 49 The constitution was further amended, changing the
ratification procedure so that each group granted separate voting
rights by the International Executive Board would vote on the total
contract separately and not merely the part having special
reference to the group. Although the convention would seem to
have given the skilled workers ample protection, their efforts to
secure separate representation were continuing through the ISST.
In August of the following year, another set of petitions for
representation elections were dismissed by the NLRB regional
director. Petitions filed for eighty-four plants of General Motors,
Ford, and Chrysler, were dismissed for the same reason as in
1958--"insufficient showing of interest. '50 The ISST had not been
able to produce signatures for thirty percent of the skilled trades
employees in the scattered plants of each of the three major
companies. The regional director defended the industrial unit,
found the UAW responsive to the problems of the skilled men, and
said: "[T]he overall interest to be served through maintaining the
stability of the existing bargaining unit outweighs such special
interests as the skilled trades . . . might have."' 51 In short, employee
free choice was again sacrificed to bigness and stability.
For the skilled workers in the auto industry there is a sad
epilogue to this tale. In the 1973 negotiations at Ford Motor
Company, the skilled trades workers voted overwhelmingly against
acceptance of the new proposed agreement, 20,089 to 5,943.
However, the production workers accepted the terms by the vote of
112,154 to 38,684. The international union signed the agreement
despite the skilled trades vote. A group of skilled tradesmen
appealed to the Public Review Board of the UAW on the ground
that the signing of the agreement was contrary to the constitutional
provision giving the skilled workers a right to "veto" the
49 See UNITED AUTOMOBILE WORKERS OF AMERICA (UAW), PROCEEDINGS, TWENTIETH
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 404-13 (1966).
50 Wall St. J., Aug. 2, 1967, at 24, col. 2.
51 Id. at col. 3.
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agreement.5 2 The majority of the Public Review Board supported
the international executive board members who had signed the
agreement. The Review Board members based their decision on
the legislative history of the constitutional changes affecting skilled
workers, its interpretation of the current language of the
constitution, and the fact that a similar circumstance at a Budd
plant had given rise to an unsuccessful challenge by the skilled
workers, later rejected by the 1970 convention.
The reasoning of the majority was rejected by Board Members
Arthurs and St. Antoine, both attorneys, who prepared a minority
opinion dissenting in part. Since the collective bargaining
agreement had been signed by the international union and the
company, the minority members acknowledged that the agreement
could not be set aside. However, they disagreed with their
colleagues about the legislative history and the implementation of
the constitutional provision under question. They concluded that
the constitution did provide for a skilled worker veto of national
agreements and made it clear to what extent the pressure of NLRB
cases pending at the time of both conventions (1957 and 1966)
exerted influence on behalf of the skilled group.53
The minority opinion traced the development of the disputed
constitutional provisions from 1957 to 1966. The majority of the
Board, they said, had converted "what was clearly intended to be a
democratic process into an autocratic one, '5 4 attributing to the
constitutional convention the decision to give skilled tradesmen and
other specialized employees "the right of separate ratification so
that their minority interest might be better protected. '55
Acknowledging that the convention discussions should be
considered in the light of existing circumstances, the two dissenters
said:
The International Society of Skilled Trades, not yet defanged by
the NLRB ruling requiring that craft severance be accomplished
company-wide rather than plant-by-plant, claimed significant
membership among UAW skilled tradesmen. Viewed in this
context, what occurred at the 1957 and 1966 Conventions
becomes, we feel, very understandable. Far from being
ambiguous, the proceedings plainly bespeak an intention to find
a solution to the problem posed by the threat of massive skilled
52 The following pages are drawn from Poszich v. UAW Local 316 (Pub. Rev. Bd., Int'l
Union, UAW, Ap. 10, 1974), BNA Daily Labor Report No. 75, at E-10, Ap. 17, 1974.
53 The dissent deserves to be widely read by persons interested in this subject. Id. at
E-8 to -10.
54 Id. at E-8.
55 Id.
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trades defection by granting to skilled tradesmen a certain
amount of autonomy within the industrial union structure 56
The minority opinion continued, tracing events at the 1966
convention when the constitution was amended to its present form.
"Delegate after delegate" spoke in favor of the change, referring to
the threat posed by the Society of Skilled Trades as justification for
the amendment. Had there been any doubt in the minds of the
delegates about what they were doing, this was dispelled by an
explanation offered by "then Vice-President Woodcock," quoted as
follows:
But there was one question we did not clearly answer in
1957. There was one question we have not clearly answered to
this day. What happens when one group rejects and the other
accepts? ... what happens when production accepts and skilled
trade rejects?
We never clearly answered that question. But we want to say
here and now that separate ratification is an empty process, and
it cannot trigger necessary action to solve problems that have led
to the rejection if it does not lead to pressure on the companies.
So we want to say very clearly, if either group rejects, then
there is no agreement.
(Applause.)57
Why did the officers in 1973 reject a position which one of
their number had so unequivocally stated in 1966? One can only
guess. So long as the NLRB offered an avenue of escape from
unsatisfactory representation for skilled workers, the officers had
no choice but to respond to those workers. Absent the avenue of
escape, the officers respond to the majority of the members,
demonstrating again that an industrial union finds it politically
difficult to accommodate legitimate special interests within its
membership, such as those of skilled tradesmen, technical employ-
ees, or others with specialized qualifications.
D. Contract Bar Rule Limits Free Choice
Another administrative decision of the NLRB that thwarts
employee free choice is the contract bar rule-the period of a
contract's duration that the Board is willing to use as a bar to the
filing of a petition for a change in representation. The law provides
that no election may be held in a bargaining unit in which there has
been a previous election within the preceding twelve months. 58 At
56 Id.
57 Id at E-9 (emphasis omitted).
58 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1970).
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first, the one-year rule prevailed in all cases. Under pressure from
the parties, employer and union, the contract bar rule was changed
to extend the period during which a contract would be protected
from one year to two, and now three years. 59 A three-year
agreement may now operate without any challenges to the
incumbent representative.
The administrative problem here is admittedly not simple.
Employers are anxious to have long-term agreements so that labor
costs are fixed and predictable and the possibilities of work
stoppages are reduced to infrequent intervals. Union officers and
paid staff find the same objectives attractive for themselves. In view
of the no-raid pact, it is not likely that the reassertion of employee
free choice by reversion to the one-year rule set forth in- the act
would have any deleterious effects on industrial stability. Although
the choice is not easy, the resolution of the issue has been strongly
on the side of the employer and incumbent union hierarchy at the
price of still further limitations on employees.
Thus, once again the employer has joined with the union
leadership in minimizing, wherever possible, freedom of choice on
the part of the employees. One could hardly argue with an
employer who deliberately sought to minimize freedom of choice
or union democracy by any legal means available to him, but the
consequences to the employees are disastrous. The employee who
is dissatisfied with his union because it is corrupt, negligent,
careless, or insufficiently attentive to his personal views, will find
that the obstacles within the union to organizing an opposition will
always be formidable. Perhaps they ought to be; perhaps dissent
ought never to be easy. But in the United States, the dissident
employee can sometimes, given sufficient reason and support,
overcome the opposition and unseat the incumbent leadership or
reject the offending union. At least he could do so in a fair fight.
Unfortunately, the fight is not fair, because the employer has been
enlisted on the side of the incumbent union through the devices of
compulsory unionism, multiplant units, and long-term contracts.
E. Court Enforcement of Union Fines
When the Supreme Court ruled in the NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers6"
case, and a succession of other cases,61 that union fines could be
collected through the courts, another blow was struck against
"See Survey of Basic Patterns in Union Contracts, reported in BNA Daily Labor Report, No.
252, at 10, Dec. 31, 1974.
&0 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
61 Cf. NLRB v. Boeing, 412 U.S. 67 (1973); Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
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employee free choice. Some of the implications of this line of
reasoning are so complex and obscure that one cannot readily
predict where it will lead.62
Unions have always been able to use their internal processes to
assess fines against members or take lesser measures to deal with
offenses against the organization. These offenses might include the
crossing of authorized picket lines, acting as stool pigeons, failing
to attend meetings, violating the constitution, or engaging in
"conduct unbecoming a member." But the only method of
enforcement was the threat of expulsion from the union. 63 Before
1947, expulsion under a union shop agreement was equivalent to
being fired, since union membership was required. Since the
Taft-Hartley revisions, expulsion would not have such effect; it
would merely deprive the union of dues payment.
Under these circumstances, unions wafit very much to be able
to collect fines through the courts. Court enforcement greatly
strengthens the union's capacity to bring pressure on its members.
Most of the court cases have involved the crossing of picket lines
and working during an authorized strike. In Allis-Chalmers, a
number of men who had crossed picket lines and worked during a
strike were charged, found guilty by the UAW of having violated
the international constitution, and fined from $20 to $100 per
man. The men refused to pay, the union went to court, and the
company filed unfair labor practice charges against the union
under section 8(b)(1)(A). 64 A 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court
ruled that there was no unfair labor practice and that the fines
could be collected through the courts. 65 Both the majority and
dissenting opinions referred to the legislative history and federal
labor policy, but reached opposite conclusions. The majority
62 For a full treatment of the cases cited here as well as related cases, see Wellington,
Mr. Buckley and the Unions: Of Union Discipline and Member Dissidence, in UNION POWER AND
PUBLIC POLICY 25-49 (Conf. at Cornell Univ. 1975).
63 There is a fundamental difference between unions which have some control over
hiring (construction trades, for example) and those where all the hiring is done by the
employer. In the former case the threat of expulsion is real and effective, since it may mean
deprivation of employment. No other sanction is necessary. In manufacturing industries, on
the contrary, expulsion might be greeted with joy since it would have the additional
advantage of relieving the dissenter of the burden of paying dues.
64 388 U.S. at 176-77. Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA provides:
[I]t shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
section [157]: Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor
organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of
membership therein . ...
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1970).
65 388 U.S. at 195-97.
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construed the fine as a matter of internal union affairs, not cov-
ered by the prohibition against union coercion. 66 The minority
opinion found evidence of a much broader application. 67
Since Allis-Chalmers, the issue has become complicated by
questions concerning the "reasonableness" of the union fine, the
contractual relationship between union member and union based
on the union constitution, and the union member's right to resign
legally from the union.68 Enforcement of union fines through the
courts may turn upon the ultimate answers to these questions.
Leaving aside all the doubts one may have about the degree of
democracy in internal union decisions (especially those involving
strikes), the effect upon employee free choice is sobering. Is a
decision to support a strike irrevocable? Is the employer somehow
to be excluded from participating in a decision which affects him so
nearly, except by agreeing with the union? Above all, can
individual employees no longer vote (as union men used to say in
1935) "with their feet?"
Allis-Chalmers added an unexpected and highly welcome
weapon to the arsenal available to union leadership. It permits the
union to levy fines for a wide variety of causes and to collect them
in the courts. But even more importantly, it established a new
atmosphere within the union, an atmosphere unfriendly to union
dissidents, critics, and nonconformists. It undoubtedly inhibits the
membership of the union in their efforts to seek new rep-
resentation or decertification, even though the NLRB tries sys-
tematically to protect the principle that employees may not be
inhibited in their right to choose a different union. It is altogether
:6 Id. at 195.
67 The minority found the fines to be indicative of the coercion and restraint that the
NLRA was specifically designed to prevent. 388 U.S. at 208-10.
"' Those who think of resignation as a reasonable protection for employees should
consult union constitutions more carefully. Note the following provision in the constitution
of the democratic UAW:
A member may resign or terminate his membership only if he is in good standing.
. . . Such resignation or termination shall be effective only if by written
communication, signed by the member, and sent by registered or certified mail,
return receipt requested, to the Financial Secretary of the Local Union within the
ten (10) day period prior to the end of the fiscal year of the Local Union as fixed by
this Constitution, whereupon it shall be effective sixty (60) days after the end of
such fiscal year; provided; that if the employer of such member has been
authorized either by such member individually or by the Collective Bargaining
Agreement between the employer and the Union to check off the membership dues
of such member, then such resignation shall become effective upon the effective
termination of such authorization, or upon the expiration of such sixty (60) day
period, whichever is later.
UAW CONST., art. VI, § 17 (adopted at Atlantic City, N.J., Ap. 1972). Note that the fiscal
year ends on the 31st day of December.
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too much to expect that the ordinary employee, even the dissident
employee, will always know what the law provides. It is equally
unlikely that a harassed leadership will explain to each dissatisfied
employee his rights under the law and the union constitution.
CONCLUSION
The above is not intended to be a catalogue of horrors. Quite
the contrary. For many of the limitations on free choice there is
historical and sometimes current justification. The exceptions are
the multiplant rule and court enforcement of union fines. Leaving
these aside, it is not the separate limitations on freedom of choice
which are so devastating, but their collective effect. The union shop
or any other form of compulsory unionism would not seem
unbearable if it were possible to challenge the incumbent union on
a single-plant basis in any year. Nor would a three-year contract be
objectionable if the affected employees could belong to any one of
the several unions-or none-during the life of that contract. But
the choices available to workers have been withdrawn remorse-
lessly.
Consider the plight of a young man or woman who goes to
work in a bargaining unit job at the U.S. Steel Corporation. The
personnel director tells him that as a condition of employment he
must join the United Steelworkers of America. As long as he is
employed by the company, he will pay whatever dues have been set
at the USA convention and will have seen them climb to their
present level of twice his hourly rate. If he becomes dissatisfied
with USA representation, he can form an opposition, but the
chances of success in replacing the USA or decertifying it will
depend upon his being able to muster a petition signed by thirty
percent of all the employees in the entire corporation! No one
could possibly take on this task except, conceivably, another well-
heeled union. But this action is forbidden to affiliates by section
20 of the AFL-CIO Constitution. If, in his frustration, he goes
through a picket line or does one of a number of other things the
union does not like, the employee can be fined and taken to court
if he refuses to pay.
In the final analysis, freedom of choice requires that union
leaders not be relieved of the ordinary pressures which are brought
to bear in a democratic organization. If the multiplant rule, the
union shop, and the long-term contract were eliminated in the steel
industry, for example, there might be some individual or group
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defections, but not many. The Steelworkers are capable of
responding to such a situation. The leadership might resent the
need for more assiduous attention to the members, lower dues
(and therefore, less political and other spending), and the
altogether different officer-member relationship than now prevails.
Bargaining might become more difficult for both management and
union leadership. A first effect might be an increase in instability
and unpredictability in the labor-management relationship,
imposing burdens on the leadership on both sides. Why not? In
those industries which have the fewest restrictions on free choice
(e.g., electrical manufacturing and chemicals) no catastrophes have
occurred.
The withdrawal of free choice raises two questions. The first is
whether the price of stability and predictability has not become too
high, for the labor movement as well as for the future of industrial
relations. The defenders of these arrangements seem to be saying
inconsistent and contradictory things. Starting with the premise
that unions are necessary to protect the interests of workers, they
end by saying that the system works best when the democratic
process is denied or at least severely limited. However attractive to
employers, this view certainly strikes at the vitals of unionism. How
else are worker interests defined except by the democratic process?
From the point of view of society as a whole, the question is
automatically raised, "why unions?" If the function of unions is to
represent workers, and unions end up freeing themselves with the
help of employers and government from the necessities of
representation, why should the law provide them with any special
protection? If the terms of employment are going to be defined by
bureaucrats, without undergoing the difficulties and pains of the
ordinary political representation process, why do we need two sets
of bureaucrats? It could be argued that, even in the absence of any
genuine representational process, the mere ritual of collective
bargaining may result in a "bargain" which ensures a wider
acceptance of the results than otherwise. This is no doubt true. But
this is to live on borrowed time; ultimately, it would be worse than
useless-it would be dangerous.
A second, related question is whether the process is ultimately
self-destructive. To say it somewhat differently, the effectiveness
of a system of representation depends upon the constant use and
the availability of the essential machinery of representation-that
is, the process of consent, dissent, repudiation of ineffectual
representation, the constant search for good leaders, and all the
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rest. And these, in turn, are meaningless without a wide range of
choices available to the represented. To suggest that the formalities
of the collective bargaining process, the huge union convention,
and the uncontested election are adequate to the purpose is to
engage in dangerous dreams. For a while, yes, the change wrought
by the unions between 1935 and 1955 was so far-reaching that
their prestige as representatives of working people is still high.
During that formative period, there was a high degree of
membership participation and leader responsiveness, but the
increasing, persistent restrictions on free choice will erode
membership consent, which, after all, is the essential function of
union organization and collective bargaining.
There is still one important area in which free choice has been
carefully protected. For nonunion employees, when a union seeks
to organize, elections are normally held at a single location, under
carefully controlled arrangements, and with abundant opportunity
to hear all the arguments made by the employer as well as by
competing unions. This is enormously important. But to anyone
who believes in the value of unionism as a process of representation,
it is a long way from being enough. We need, in addition, more
democratic unions and a public policy which carefully protects
individual freedom of choice against the inroads of the union and
the employer or, more frequently, the two acting together. From
this vantage point, a change in public policy seems both more
urgent and more likely.
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